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Thin capitalization rules have become an important element in the corporate tax systems of 
developed countries. This paper sets up a model where national and multinational firms 
choose tax-efficient financial structures and countries compete for multinational firms through 
statutory tax rates and thin capitalization rules that limit the tax-deductibility of internal debt 
flows. In a symmetric tax competition equilibrium each country chooses inefficiently low tax 
rates and inefficiently lax thin capitalization rules. We show that a coordinated tightening of 
thin capitalization rules benefits both countries, even though it intensifies competition via tax 
rates. When countries differ in size, the smaller country not only chooses the lower tax rate 
but also the more lenient thin capitalization rule. 
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Existing corporate tax systems permit the deduction of interest payments from the
corporate tax base, whereas the equity returns to investors are not tax-deductible.
This asymmetric treatment of alternative means of ﬁnancing investment oﬀers ﬁrms
a fundamental incentive to increase their reliance on debt ﬁnance. For multinational
companies this incentive is further strengthened by the possibility to use internal debt
as a means to shift proﬁts from high-tax to low-tax countries. Recent empirical research
provides conclusive evidence that international tax diﬀerentials aﬀect multinationals’
ﬁnancial structure in a way that is consistent with overall tax minimization.1 Moreover,
while proﬁt shifting within multinational ﬁrms can occur through a variety of channels,
there are clear empirical indications that the use of ﬁnancial policies plays an important
role in this process (Grubert, 2003; Mintz, 2004). For this reason, international debt
shifting is suspected to be a core factor behind empirical ﬁndings that multinational
ﬁrms seem to pay substantially lower taxes, as a share of pre-tax proﬁts, as compared
to nationally operating ﬁrms.2
In response to these developments, many countries have introduced thin capitalization
rules, which limit the amount of interest payments to related entities that is deductible
from the corporate tax base. As of today, the majority of OECD countries includes
such constraints in their corporate tax codes, and several countries have introduced
them during the last decade.3 As an example, Germany has tightened its existing
thin capitalization rules in the corporate tax reform of 2008 by introducing a strict
limitation for the tax-deductibility of interest payments equal to 30% of the ﬁrm’s pre-
1Desai et al. (2004) show for U.S.-based multinationals that a 10% higher tax rate in the host
country of a foreign aﬃliate raises the debt-to-asset ratio of this aﬃliate by about 3-4%. Mintz and
Weichenrieder (2005) and Buettner et al. (2006) obtain quantitatively similar results for German
multinationals. Huizinga et al. (2008) provide more general evidence that the capital structure of
European multinationals is adapted in a tax-minimizing way to international diﬀerences in corporate
tax systems and corporate tax rates.
2For Europe, Egger et al. (2007) have estimated, using econometric matching techniques, that the
tax burden of an otherwise similar manufacturing plant is reduced by more than 50% when the parent
ﬁrm is foreign-owned, rather than domestically-owned. Hines (2007) ﬁnds related evidence that the
eﬀective tax payments of U.S. multinationals in their respective host countries have fallen more rapidly
than the statutory tax rates in these countries.
3Descriptions of existing thin capitalization rules are given by Gouthi` ere (2005) for most OECD
countries, and by Dourado and de la Feria (2008) for the EU member states.
1tax earnings. This new set of thin capitalization rules is explicitly targeted at the tax
planning strategies of multinational enterprises.
On the other hand, the move to stricter thin capitalization rules is not universal.
The United States, for example, which was one of the ﬁrst countries to introduce
an earnings’ stripping rule in 1989, has introduced changes to its tax code in 1997
that facilitated the use of internal debt as a tax savings instrument for multinational
ﬁrms.4 Ireland and, more recently, Spain have even abolished thin capitalization re-
strictions for loans from EU-based companies completely, in response to a 2002 ruling
by the European Court of Justice that thin capitalization rules must be set up in a
non-discriminatory way. In the case of Ireland, it is furthermore noteworthy that the
relaxation of thin capitalization rules directly followed the forced termination of Ire-
land’s split corporate tax rate, which had long been used as an instrument to provide
preferential tax treatment to multinationals. This suggests that at least some countries
might strategically use thin capitalization rules as a means to grant targeted tax relief
to multinational ﬁrms.
These recent developments have also led to an increasing awareness in the European
Union of the potential ineﬃciencies that result from a decentralized setting of thin cap-
italization rules. In a communication, the European Commission (2007) has announced
its willingness to take coordinated actions against ‘wholly artiﬁcial arrangements’ used
to shift proﬁts between establishments, and explicitly includes thin capitalization rules
as a possible countermeasure at the EU level. A more detailed discussion at the EU
level has taken place in conjunction with the proposal to introduce a Common Con-
solidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB). A working group preparing this proposal has
evaluated various alternatives to limit the deductibility of interest payments within
multinational groups (European Commission, 2008). While no speciﬁc thin capitaliza-
tion rule has been proposed yet it is generally expected that the directive proposal to
introduce a CCCTB, announced by the Commission for the fall of 2008, will include
thin capitalization provisions (see, e.g., Fuest, 2008).
Despite the policy relevance of the subject, and in contrast to a growing body of
4The main element among these tax changes were so-called ‘check-the-box’ provisions which in-
troduced hybrid entities that are considered as corporations by one country, but as unincorporated
branches by another. These rules can be used by U.S. multinationals to circumvent existing rules for
controlled foreign corporations (CFC rules), which disallow the deferral of passive business income,
including interest payments, for the aﬃliates of U.S. corporations. See OECD (2007), ch. 5.
2empirical research (see below), we are unaware of a theoretical analysis that explicitly
focuses on the positive and normative aspects of the choice of thin capitalization rules
by countries engaged in international tax competition. This is what we aim to do in
the present paper.
We consider a model with two potentially asymmetric countries and national as well as
multinational ﬁrms. Tax competition for internationally operating ﬁrms occurs through
statutory tax rates and thin capitalization rules that limit the tax-deductibility of
internal debt ﬂows within the multinational enterprise. Both multinational and national
ﬁrms can also respond to a higher domestic tax rate by increasing the level of external
debt ﬁnance. We ﬁrst consider the case of symmetric countries and show that tax
competition leads to ineﬃciently low tax rates and ineﬃciently lax thin capitalization
rules, relative to the Pareto eﬃcient solution. This serves as a convenient benchmark
from which our main results can be derived.
The ﬁrst central result of our analysis is that, starting from the symmetric tax com-
petition equilibrium, a coordinated tightening of thin capitalization rules is mutually
welfare-increasing, even if countries are free to re-optimize their statutory tax rates in
a non-cooperative fashion. Indeed we ﬁnd that countries compete more aggressively
via statutory tax rates when thin capitalization rules are coordinated. The partial pol-
icy coordination is nevertheless beneﬁcial because tax competition occurs primarily
through thin capitalization rules, which can be targeted directly at attracting interna-
tionally mobile capital.
This ﬁnding implies that regulations speciﬁcally addressed at multinational corpora-
tions, such as thin capitalization rules, may be a more important determinant of foreign
direct investment (FDI) than the statutory tax rate. This prediction receives some sup-
port from recent empirical studies. Altshuler and Grubert (2006) show that the U.S.
statutory tax rate ceased to have a signiﬁcant impact on FDI ﬂows, after the United
States had eﬀectively relaxed their thin capitalization rules in 1997 (see above). Related
evidence is reported in Buettner et al. (2008). They ﬁnd, for a sample of 24 OECD
countries, that thin capitalization rules are eﬀective in reducing ﬁrms’ debt-to-equity
ratios and thus have the potential to reduce international debt shifting. At the same
time, the study also ﬁnds that the existence and the tightness of thin capitalization
rules have signiﬁcant, adverse eﬀects on foreign direct investment.
Our second main result pertains to the case of asymmetric countries. We analyze diﬀer-
ent scenarios of asymmetric tax competition and show, inter alia, that the country with
3the smaller population size not only chooses the lower tax rate but also the more le-
nient thin capitalization rule. This is because the smaller country faces the more elastic
tax base for internationally mobile capital, but the same is not true for internationally
immobile capital. Hence the small country will ﬁnd it optimal to tax-discriminate more
in favor of mobile, multinational ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is broadly consistent with stylized
facts, which show that large countries, such as Germany, France or the United States
have rather elaborate rules limiting the interest-deductibility of internal debt, whereas
small countries such as Ireland, Luxembourg and many countries in Eastern Europe
have either no thin capitalization rules at all, or very permissive ones (Gouthi` ere, 2005;
Dourado and de la Feria, 2008).
The analysis in this paper builds on two strands in the literature. First there are several
studies which analyze, theoretically and empirically, the eﬀects of corporate taxation
on multinational ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing and investment decisions (Mintz and Smart, 2004;
Buettner et al., 2008; Schindler and Schjelderup, 2008; Weichenrieder and Windis-
chbauer, 2008). In these papers, however, the theoretical analysis serves primarily to
derive testable hypotheses for the ensuing empirical work and the focus is on the choices
made by multinational ﬁrms, not those of governments. Hence, in contrast to our paper,
the analyses do not endogenize the tax policies of countries competing for FDI.
Second, our analysis also relates to the theoretical literature that investigates whether
the abolition of tax preferences for mobile tax bases raises or reduces tax revenues
and welfare in the competing countries (Janeba and Peters, 1999; Keen, 2001; Janeba
and Smart, 2003; Haupt and Peters, 2005; Bucovetsky and Hauﬂer, 2008). A related
analysis is Peralta et al. (2006), who show that countries may have an incentive not
to monitor proﬁt shifting in multinational ﬁrms. Finally, Slemrod and Wilson (2006)
and Hong and Smart (2007) ask whether the presence of tax havens is desirable or not
from the perspective of large, high-tax countries, by permitting them to tax mobile and
immobile capital diﬀerentially. However, none of these theoretical studies addresses thin
capitalization rules, or the choice of capital structure within national and multinational
ﬁrms.5 Moreover, as will be discussed below, the policy trade-oﬀs analyzed in this
literature diﬀer in important ways from the one studied here.
5A theoretical analysis that explicitly incorporates thin capitalization rules is Fuest and Hemmel-
garn (2005). In this paper the thin capitalization rule is exogenously ﬁxed, however, and the focus is
on the eﬀects that thin capitalization has on the relationship between corporate and personal income
taxation in a union of small open economies.
4The remainder of the paper is set up as follows. Section 2 presents the basic framework.
In Section 3 we derive the Pareto eﬃcient set of tax policies in the benchmark case
where all tax instruments can be coordinated internationally. Section 4 analyzes the
non-cooperative choice of statutory tax rates and thin capitalization rules. Section 5
turns to the welfare eﬀects of a partial coordination of thin capitalization rules. Section
6 investigates asymmetric tax competition when countries diﬀer either in size or in per
capita endowments. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a model of capital tax competition in a region of two countries, labelled
A and B. The population size in country i = {A,B} equals Li and, without loss of
generality, we normalize the total population size L = LA + LB to one. Hence, the
population share in country i is si = Li/L = Li. Initially, we focus on the symmetric
case with sA = sB = 0.5, but we incorporate diﬀerences in population (or country) size
in Section 6.
An important feature of our model is that it distinguishes between two types of capital,
which are aﬀected diﬀerently by the tax policy instruments introduced below. Interna-
tionally immobile capital can only be invested in the country where its owner resides,
whereas internationally mobile capital can be invested in either country. Mobile and
immobile units of capital can equivalently be thought of as multinational and national
ﬁrms. Capital endowments are exogenously given and owned by the residents of the
two countries. Each resident in the region owns one unit of mobile capital and ni > 0
units of immobile capital. Again, we assume in most of our analysis that per capita
endowments are the same in both countries (nA = nB = n), but allow for diﬀerences
in national capital endowments in Section 6. The two types of capital are perfect sub-
stitutes and enter the production of a homogeneous output good in both countries,
whose price is normalized to unity. The per capita production function in country i is
assumed to be quadratic and given by
f(ki) = aki − (b/2)k
2
i, a,b > 0, (1)
where ki ∈ [0,a/b] is the total per capita amount of capital used for production in
country i. We assume that the source principle of capital taxation is eﬀective and
5hence capital is taxed in the country where it is employed.6 Moreover, we model the
tax as a unit tax on capital, rather than as a proportional tax on its return. It is well
known that, in settings of competitive markets, this speciﬁcation simpliﬁes the algebra
without aﬀecting the main results.
Central to our analysis are the ﬁnancial structure of ﬁrms and the associated implica-
tions for the corporate tax base. To keep the analysis as simple as possible we assume
that capital owners can provide ﬁrms either with equity or debt and, in the absence
of risk considerations, are indiﬀerent between these two ﬁnancing instruments. The
overall tax payment, however, depends on the mix of debt and equity ﬁnance. Our
modelling is based on the existing corporate tax codes of virtually all OECD countries,
which permit the deduction of interest payments for external debt from the corporate
tax base, but do not allow a similar deduction for the cost of equity.7
Let us ﬁrst consider immobile national ﬁrms (superscript n). Denote by αn
i ∈ [0,1] the
share of debt ﬁnancing that is chosen by national ﬁrms in country i, which is fully
deductible from the corporate tax base. We will label this source of ﬁnance external
debt (i.e., debt owed to independent creditors), in order to distinguish it from internal
debt ﬂows within a multinational enterprise, as introduced below. While the ﬁnancing
of capital via external debt will thus confer tax savings to the ﬁrm, it is associated with
non-tax costs that are discussed in detail in the corporate ﬁnance literature (see Myers,
2001, for a survey). Speciﬁcally, a high level of external debt raises the possibility of
ﬁnancial distress, including the costs associated with possible bankruptcy. Moreover,
a higher default risk will increase agency costs due to conﬂicting interests between
managers and shareholders and, in more complex settings than the one studied here,
between shareholders and debtholders of the ﬁrm. On the other hand, the agency
literature also stresses that some level of external debt may be desirable in order to
6The source principle applies directly, if countries avoid international double taxation by exempting
foreign-earned income from domestic tax. This is true for the majority of OECD members but several
countries, notably the United States and the United Kingdom, employ instead an international tax
credit. Even in this case, however, foreign-earned proﬁts are not taxed by the residence country until
they are repatriated. This gives ﬁrms an incentive to defer repatriation, if an additional tax is due
in their home country. With the possibility of deferral and similar strategies to avoid home country
taxation, the evidence seems to be that the eﬀective residence-based tax rate on foreign subsidiary
proﬁts is close to zero, and only source-based taxation is eﬀective (see, e.g. Tanzi, 1995, Ch. 6-7).
7The only exception is Belgium, which has introduced a ‘notional interest deduction’ from its
corporate tax base in 2006. For an analysis of such investment-neutral corporate tax schemes in the
presence of international proﬁt shifting, see Hauﬂer and Schjelderup (2000).
6protect the ﬁrm from ‘empire building’ strategies of its managers. We model these
diﬀerent arguments in a highly stylized way, by specifying a target level of external
debt, ¯ α ∈ [0,1], at which the ﬁrm faces no extra costs of its ﬁnancial structure. Any
deviation from this target level will lead to agency costs that are convex in the distance
to the target level ¯ α. For simplicity, we consider quadratic agency costs β(αn
i − ¯ α)2/2
where β > 0 parameterizes the extra costs of a non-optimal ﬁnancial structure.8
Let ti be the statutory tax rate in country i. The eﬀective tax rate faced by the domestic
ﬁrm in country i is then τn
i = ti(1 − αn
i ). By using (1), the net return to immobile
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The ﬁrm then chooses the share of external debt so as to maximize the common net
return to its shareholders and bondholders. This yields
α
n




In the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial optimum the tax beneﬁts of a higher level of external debt are
traded oﬀ against the agency costs. Hence the debt ratio chosen by the ﬁrm is a falling
function of the agency cost parameter β and a rising function of the tax rate ti.9
Inserting (2) into τn
i and rn










and the net return to immobile capital in country i
r
n
i = a − bki − ti
￿





as functions of the tax rate ti and per capita investment ki in country i.
The fact that the corporation tax distorts the ﬁnancing decisions of internationally
immobile ﬁrms implies that no lump-sum taxes exist in our model. Hence, a non-
distortive tax policy cannot simply be achieved by fully exempting mobile capital from
tax. It should also be emphasized that our analysis of the tax advantages of external
8Our speciﬁcation includes a zero target level of debt (¯ α = 0) as a special case. For a similar
modelling of agency costs see, e.g. Schindler and Schjelderup (2008).
9Empirical evidence for the positive relationship between the statutory tax rate and the share of
external debt is given in Gordon and Lee (2001).
7debt is conﬁned to the level of the corporation and ignores the diﬀerent tax treatment
of equity and debt ﬁnance at the shareholder level. There is a general agreement in
the literature, however, that a tax advantage of debt is still present, though reduced in
size, when personal income taxes are also taken into account.10
Let us now turn to the multinational enterprise (MNE). It is assumed that external
debt ﬁnance has the same tax advantages and the same costs for the multinational as
for the domestic ﬁrm. However, the MNE has the additional opportunity to engage in
ﬁnancial transactions between its aﬃliates. We focus on the role such transactions play
in minimizing the aggregate tax burden. Hence we assume that the MNE in each of
countries A and B can set up a ﬁnancial subsidiary in a tax haven country C, which
oﬀers a zero tax rate on capital income. Furthermore, suppose the subsidiary in country
C can make an intra-company loan to the producing subsidiary, which is located in
either country A or B. The interest paid for this loan is deductible in the country of
production, whereas the interest income of the ﬁnancial aﬃliate in the tax haven is
taxed at a zero rate. Hence, the net eﬀect of this triangular structure is to remove
the share of capital that is ﬁnanced by internal (i.e., intra-company) debt from the
corporate tax base of the multinational ﬁrm.11
We further assume that internal debt ﬁnancing is not associated with agency costs, or
costs of ﬁnancial distress, because the overall liquidity of the MNE is unaﬀected by the
transaction.12 The lack of agency costs implies that the ratio of internal debt chosen by
the MNE in country i will always be at the maximum of what is permitted by the thin
capitalization rules of this country. We thus model a thin capitalization rule (TCR)
as an upper limit on the share of intra-ﬁrm debt that the multinational ﬁrm receives
from a subsidiary in the tax haven and that can be deducted from the MNE’s tax base
in the home country. The permitted share of deductible intra-ﬁrm debt is denoted by
10When taxes at the shareholder level are incorporated, the eﬀective tax rate on capital ﬁnanced
by debt equals the personal income tax rate of the investor, whereas the tax rate on equity equals the
sum of corporation and capital gains taxes (provided that no dividends are paid out). See Auerbach
(2002) for more details and Fuest and Hemmelgarn (2005) for an analysis of tax competition when
governments can choose both corporate and personal income taxes (but not thin capitalization rules).
11See Mintz (2004) and OECD (2007, chap. 5) for more detailed descriptions of triangular, or
‘conduit’ ﬁnancing structures used by MNEs.
12This assumption is clearly a simpliﬁcation, but it is supported by empirical evidence that the costs
of a higher debt-asset ratio are substantially reduced when the debt is owed to an aﬃliated company
(see Desai et al., 2004).
8λi ∈ [0,1] and we restrict it to be non-negative.13
At ﬁrst sight, our modelling of TCRs as a threshold that applies exclusively to internal
debt seems to diﬀer from the thin capitalization rules of several OECD countries, which
restrict the sum of internal and external debt. In the United States, for example, the
permitted debt-to-equity ratio is 1.5 to 1, corresponding to a share of 60% of the ﬁrm’s
capital being ﬁnanced by debt. If a company stays below this threshold, all interest
payments will automatically be tax-deductible. The rationale behind this safe haven
approach is that the distinction between internal and external debt is often diﬃcult to
draw in practice and hence it is administratively easier to specify an acceptable share of
overall debt for each aﬃliate. However, when a company’s debt-to-equity ratio is above
the safe-haven ratio, so that it comes to restricting the level of deductible debt, then
the distinction between internal and external debt is drawn and deductibility is denied
only for internal loans. Hence, the ﬁnal choice parameter of governments is indeed the
deductible share of internal debt, as speciﬁed in our analysis.
The eﬀective tax rate on immobile ﬁrms (superscript m) in country i is then τm
i =
ti(1 − αm
i − λi), where αm
i is the share of external debt of a mobile ﬁrm in country i.
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Maximizing this expression with respect to the MNE’s share of external debt yields
αm
i = ¯ α+ti/β, and hence the same decision rule as for national ﬁrms [cf. eq. (2)]. The
maximum permissible share of internal debt, λi, is instead set by the government of
country i, and is fully exploited by the multinational in its ﬁnancial optimum. Hence,
the MNE’s eﬀective tax rate is lower than that of domestic ﬁrms, whenever a positive
allowance is also made for internal debt (i.e., λi > 0). Using the optimized value for
αm










yielding a net return to mobile capital equal to
r
m
i = a − bki − ti
￿





13Allowing for negative values of λi would imply that countries could eﬀectively restrict the tax-
deductibility of external debt for multinational ﬁrms, but not for domestic ﬁrms. This is clearly
incompatible with current principles of corporate income taxation.
9These expressions show that MNEs are aﬀected by both policy instruments in our
analysis. In particular, a tightening of the TCR (a reduction in λi) raises the eﬀective
tax rate and reduces the net return to mobile capital in this country.
In a capital market equilibrium, the worldwide capital demand must equal the sum of
mobile and immobile capital endowments. Expressed in per capita terms, we obtain
sAkA + sBkB = 1 + sAnA + sBnB. (7)
Moreover, international arbitrage has to ensure that the net return to mobile capital
is the same in the two countries. Setting rm
A = rm
B in (6) and using (7) yields

















with i,j ∈ {A,B} and i  = j. Equation (8) shows that an increase in country i’s
statutory tax rate and a tightening of its TCR both induce a capital outﬂow from
country i to country j.
Each resident in country i consumes the num´ eraire output good in quantity xi. Per
capita after-tax income is composed of the net returns from the endowments of mobile
and immobile capital and the residual remuneration of an inelastically supplied factor
of production (e.g. labor). The latter equals the value of domestic output, less the
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Each government collects taxes from both mobile and immobile capital. Mobile capital
employed in country i is given by ki − ni. Per capita tax revenue in country i is thus
zi = τ
m
i (ki − ni) + τ
n
i ni = τ
m
i ki + nitiλi, (10)
where the second step has used τn
i − τm
i = tiλi from (3) and (5).
To specify national welfare, we assume a ﬁxed marginal rate of substitution between
private and public consumption where each Euro of tax revenue is worth 1 + ε Euros
of private income (with ε > 0). This speciﬁcation ensures that both countries levy
positive capital taxes in equilibrium. One way to motivate this speciﬁcation is to think
of zi as a public good with a constant marginal valuation (in terms of the private
num´ eraire good) that exceeds its cost. Alternatively, there is another distortionary tax
in the background to ﬁnance public goods (a personal income tax, or a value-added
10tax), and this other tax has a marginal excess burden of ε. Revenue collections from
the corporation tax thus allow to reduce the distortions resulting from this other tax,
while keeping public good supply constant. Finally, a still diﬀerent interpretation is
that policy makers want to attract voters that perceive corporate taxes as being ‘too
low’, and hence attach an extra value of ε to each Euro collected from corporation tax.
Per capita welfare in country i is then deﬁned as









i + (1 + ε)(τ
m
i ki + nitiλi), (11)
where rn
i and rm
i must be substituted from (4) and (6), the eﬀective tax rates τn
i and
τm
i are given in (3) and (5) and ki is given in (8).
3 Benchmark: Pareto eﬃcient tax policy
As a benchmark, we derive the Pareto eﬃcient tax policy when countries A and B
can fully coordinate both their tax rates and their thin capitalization rules. In this
and the following two sections we focus on the symmetric case with sA = sB = 0.5
and nA = nB = n. Hence we can assume that each country sets its tax policy so as
to maximize the sum of utilities, uA + uB. Denoting the Pareto eﬃcient policy by the
superscript PO, the appendix shows that
t
PO =
βε(1 − ¯ α)
1 + 2ε
, λ
PO = 0. (12)
These results can be explained as follows. In a symmetric situation, common changes in
the tax instrument aﬀect neither the distribution nor the aggregate amount of capital.
Hence, relaxing the common thin capitalization rule by increasing λi only has the eﬀect
of lowering each country’s tax base. This increases the net return obtained by mobile
capital, but it reduces tax revenues by the same amount. Since tax revenues have the
higher weight in the national welfare functions (as reﬂected by ε > 0), it is thus never
optimal to increase λi above zero. In contrast, the Pareto eﬃcient statutory tax rate is
always positive. It is optimized when the marginal excess burden of corporate taxation,
which is caused by national and multinational ﬁrms choosing ineﬃciently high levels of
external debt ﬁnance, is equated to the extra value of corporate tax revenue. For this
reason, tPO is rising in ε. Moreover, it is rising in the agency cost parameter β, because
high costs of ﬁnancial distress make it unattractive for ﬁrms to pursue a high-debt
policy for tax reasons, thus reducing the elasticity with which the corporate tax base
responds to the statutory tax rate.
114 Tax competition
Let us now turn to the case where the two governments in A and B simultaneously
and non-cooperatively choose their tax policies. We assume that tax rates and thin
capitalization rules are chosen simultaneously, implying that they are equally ﬂexible
instruments from the perspective of each government. This speciﬁcation is supported by
several recent corporate tax reforms, such as the German and Irish reforms mentioned
in the introduction, where tax rates and thin capitalization restrictions were changed
simultaneously or immediately following one another. It can also be argued that the
U.S. tax code changes in 1997 represented an imperfect substitute for a reduction in
the statutory tax rate (and, as we will see, a superior adjustment from a national per-
spective), as it allowed the United States to maintain a statutory tax rate substantially
above the OECD average, despite increasing competition for mobile capital.
With these assumptions, country i maximizes its per capita welfare (11) with respect
to its policy instruments ti and λi, taking as given the choices of tj and λj in country
j  = i. The tax policies in the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game
are derived in the appendix and given by
t
∗ =
β ε n (1 − ¯ α)




(1 + ε) (1 + n)(1 − ¯ α)
(1 + ε)(1 + n) + εn
−
2b[(1 + ε)(1 + n) + εn]
β n (1 + ε) (1 − ¯ α)
. (14)
Equation (13) shows that the equilibrium tax rate is positive whenever there is a
positive excess value of corporate tax revenue (ε). In contrast, the equilibrium level of
the thin capitalization rule is composed of a positive and a negative term. An interior
solution (λ∗ > 0) will only be an equilibrium when the second term in (14) is suﬃciently
small. This is true, in particular, when the parameter b is small, so that mobile capital
responds elastically to the eﬀective tax rates [see equation (8)]. A low value of b thereby
leads to strong incentives for each country to underbid the eﬀective tax rate of its
neighbor by relaxing the thin capitalization rule (i.e., by raising λi). In the following
we will assume that tax competition is suﬃciently ‘strong’ in this sense. Note also that
the permitted share of internal debt is always less than 1−¯ α, since the ﬁrst term in (14)
is less than this value, and the second term is negative.
We are now in the position to compare the tax policies in the non-cooperative Nash
equilibrium with the Pareto eﬃcient taxes under full policy coordination:
12Proposition 1 Suppose sA = sB = 0.5, nA = nB = n and the tax competition game
attains a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then the statutory tax rate is ineﬃciently low
(t∗ < tPO). Moreover, if tax competition is suﬃciently strong (b is suﬃciently low),
then the equilibrium thin capitalization rule is ineﬃciently lax (λ∗ > λPO = 0).
Proof: Follows directly from comparing (12) with (13) and (14). ￿
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 1 is a standard result in the tax competition literature.
Our focus is on the second part, which highlights the role of the thin capitalization
rule as a policy instrument in the tax competition for mobile capital. Relaxing the
TCR (increasing λi) reallocates income from the public sector to the private sector.
This eﬀect on its own is welfare-reducing for each country, for the reasons discussed
above. When tax policies are non-cooperatively chosen, however, increasing λi attracts
mobile capital from the neighboring country. Moreover, in contrast to the statutory tax
rate, this instrument can be targeted directly at mobile, multinational ﬁrms. Hence, a
policy of lenient thin capitalization rules can attract capital at a lower cost, in terms
of the foregone tax revenue, than when only the (non-discriminatory) statutory tax
rate is used for this purpose. This positive tax allowance for internal debt implies
that MNEs will be tax-favored in the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, relative to
nationally operating ﬁrms.
Importantly for the ensuing analysis, common changes in the exogenous parameters of
our model aﬀect the policy instruments in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium in very
diﬀerent ways. To see this in more detail, we compute the eﬀective tax rates on mobile
and immobile ﬁrms by substituting (13) and (14) into (3) and (5). This yields
τ
n∗ =
εβn(1 − ¯ α)2(1 + ε)(1 + n)





We can then immediately state:
Proposition 2 In a symmetric tax competition equilibrium with λ∗
i > 0, the following
holds: (i) A higher degree of international tax base mobility (a fall in b) reduces the
eﬀective tax rate on mobile ﬁrms, but does not change the eﬀective tax rate on immobile
ﬁrms. (ii) A higher domestic tax base elasticity (a fall in β) reduces the eﬀective tax
rate on national ﬁrms, but leaves the eﬀective tax rate on mobile ﬁrms unchanged.
Proof: Follows directly from eq. (15). ￿
The reason for part (i) of Proposition 2 is that more intensive tax competition (a fall
in b) induces each country to relax its thin capitalization rule [according to (14)], but it
13does not alter statutory tax rates [eq.(13)]. Hence this parameter change unambiguously
increases the degree of tax discrimination in favour of MNEs, which can be expressed
as τn∗ −τm∗ = t∗λ∗. By relaxing only the TCR, tax concessions can be targeted at the
base that has become more mobile internationally, thus avoiding any revenue loss from
the taxation of national ﬁrms. Conversely, the rationale for part (ii) of the proposition
is that a reduction in the cost parameter for external debt (a fall in β) lowers the
statutory tax rate and thus the eﬀective taxation of national ﬁrms. For multinational
ﬁrms, however, this reduction is fully compensated by a tightening of the TCR. The
reason is that, with λ∗
i > 0, the international mobility of the tax base is the binding
constraint for the eﬀective taxation of mobile ﬁrms, and this constraint is unaﬀected if
the (domestic) costs of external indebtedness are reduced. In sum, therefore, eq. (15)
shows that the eﬀective tax rate on national ﬁrms is driven by the agency costs of
higher external debt, whereas the tax rate on multinational ﬁrms is solely determined
by the degree of international tax base mobility.
5 Partial coordination of thin capitalization rules
In the previous section we have seen that tax competition will lead to ineﬃciently low
tax rates and ineﬃciently lax thin capitalization rules. In this section we thus consider
the eﬀects of a coordinated tightening of TCRs in both countries. At the same time we
assume that each country is free to adjust its tax rate in a nationally optimal way to
the new thin capitalization restrictions. This partial policy coordination is the relevant
scenario in the EU, where the European Commission proposes to introduce coordinated
thin capitalization rules within the framework of the Common Consolidated Corporate
Tax Base, but simultaneously emphasizes that member states remain free to set their
tax rates autonomously (see Fuest, 2008). Outside the EU, it is even more obvious
that any attempt to coordinate TCRs in order to combat international debt shifting
by MNEs will not be accompanied by simultaneous restrictions on countries’ corporate
tax rates. The constraint that not all policy instruments can be chosen in a coordinated
fashion opens up the possibility that countries respond to the coordinated tightening of
thin capitalization rules by competing more aggressively via statutory tax rates. Since
this will also reduce the taxation of immobile ﬁrms, the welfare eﬀects of a partial
coordination of TCRs are ambiguous a priori.
In analyzing this issue in our framework, we maintain the assumption of fully symmetric
14countries. Under this assumption, we determine the total change in country j’s utility
caused by a marginal reduction in both countries’ thin capitalization variable. Formally,











, i  = j. (16)
The total eﬀect of the partial coordination on country j’s welfare is thus composed
of a direct eﬀect and an indirect eﬀect. The direct eﬀect measures the impact of the
reduction in country i’s thin capitalization variable λi on country j’s welfare. The
indirect eﬀect works through the impact of the partial coordination of TCRs on country
i’s tax rate, and the resulting eﬀect of the change in ti on country j’s welfare. Note
that the expression dti/dλ is the response of country i’s statutory tax rate to the
simultaneous changes in λi and λj.




(1 + ε)τm,∗ t∗
2b
< 0 i  = j. (17)
Hence, the direct eﬀect of a small reduction in λi is beneﬁcial for country j. An isolated
tightening of country i’s TCR increases the eﬀective tax rate on mobile capital in this
country and leads to a reallocation of mobile capital to country j.
Similarly, a statutory tax increase in country i also beneﬁts the neighboring country j.












> 0 i  = j. (18)
To determine the overall sign of the indirect eﬀect in (16), we have to establish whether
partial policy coordination increases or decreases country i’s statutory tax rate. It is








∆ = (1 + n + 2εn)n
2(1 − ¯ α)
2β(1 + ε) + 2b(1 + n + ε + 2εn)
2 > 0. (20)
Hence each country responds to the coordinated tightening of thin capitalization rules
(dλ < 0) by lowering its statutory tax rate. Intuitively, as the partial policy coordina-
tion restricts each country’s ability to attract mobile capital by means of lax TCRs, tax
14In deriving (16) we used the ﬁrst-order conditions ∂uj/∂tj = 0 and ∂uj/∂λj = 0, since both
instruments were chosen optimally from country j’s perspective before the variation in TCRs.
15competition will shift to a more aggressive lowering of statutory corporate tax rates.
Together with (18) this implies that the indirect eﬀect of a coordinated tightening of
TCRs in (16) is negative and counteracts the direct eﬀect.
Can the net welfare eﬀect of the coordination measure nevertheless be signed? In our
model it turns out that the direct eﬀect of a tightening of thin capitalization rules







εn(1 − ¯ α)(1 + n + 2εn)
(1 + n + ε + 2εn)
< 0. (21)
This yields one of the main results of our analysis:
Proposition 3 Starting from a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the tax competition
game, a coordinated tightening of thin capitalization rules increases welfare in both
countries, even though statutory tax rates in both countries are simultaneously reduced.
To see why the partial coordination of TCRs is mutually welfare-increasing, despite
the simultaneous reduction in statutory tax rates, we return to the properties of the
Nash equilibrium discussed in the previous section (Proposition 2). We have seen there
that international tax competition for mobile capital occurs primarily through thin
capitalization rules, which can be targeted directly at the internationally mobile tax
base. The statutory tax rate, while also being aﬀected by international tax competition,
will instead balance the overall eﬃciency losses from the corporation tax (caused by
both an excess use of external debt and an international capital outﬂow) against the
extra value of corporate tax revenues. Hence restricting the use of TCRs through
international policy coordination deprives countries of their most aggressive instrument
in international tax competition. Therefore, a coordinated increase in TCRs reduces
the overall intensity of tax competition, and hence also the associated welfare losses.
Proposition 3 implies that restricting the use of discriminatory tax policies is col-
lectively welfare-increasing in our model, even if not all policy instruments can be
coordinated. It is therefore worthwhile to brieﬂy compare our model to the literature
analyzing the abolition of preferential tax regimes (Janeba and Peters, 1999; Keen,
2001; Janeba and Smart, 2003; Haupt and Peters, 2005). This literature uses a model
where each of two tax bases, which diﬀer in their degree of international mobility, is
taxed by a separate instrument. The policy question asked is then whether tax revenues
will be raised or lowered when countries are forced to choose the same tax rate on both
tax bases. As shown by Janeba and Smart (2003), the net revenue eﬀect of this measure
16will depend, in general, on the elasticities with which the diﬀerent tax bases respond
to unilateral and coordinated changes in tax rates.15 The core diﬀerence in the present
model is that the mobile tax base is simultaneously aﬀected by both policy instruments
considered, and both are distorted in the direction of an insuﬃcient taxation of capital
in the initial, non-cooperative equilibrium. Hence, the welfare eﬀects of the partial co-
ordination measure do not depend primarily on (a comparison of) tax base elasticities,
but on the question of whether the coordinated policy instrument is the one that is
more closely targeted at the internationally mobile tax base in the unconstrained tax
competition equilibrium.
6 Asymmetries between countries
So far, our analysis has focused on the special case where the two countries are identical
in all respects. There are, however, a number of relevant asymmetries among countries
and it is interesting to analyze how such diﬀerences aﬀect equilibrium tax rates and thin
capitalization rules. As in much of the tax competition literature, discrete diﬀerences in
country characteristics are diﬃcult to handle analytically in our framework. Our model
is simple enough, however, to permit some important analytical insights by focusing
on small diﬀerences between the two countries. In the following we ﬁrst analyze cross-
country diﬀerences in population size and then turn to the case where countries have
diﬀerent per capita endowments of (internationally immobile) capital.
Starting from an initially symmetric Nash equilibrium of the tax competition game,
we analyze the eﬀects of a marginal decrease in country i’s population size, which is
accompanied by an equal increase in the population size of country j. To isolate the
eﬀects of country size we maintain equal per capita endowments for the residents of
both counties (ni = nj = n). Hence, when decreasing (increasing) the population size of
country i (j) we simultaneously and proportionally reduce (raise) this country’s capital
stock. Formally, we compute the eﬀects of dsi = −dsj < 0 and evaluate these eﬀects
15Bucovetsky and Hauﬂer (2008) consider a model of tax discrimination when governments choose
a tax rate and a tax preference parameter for the mobile base. In this model the size of the mobile
and the immobile tax base is not given exogenously and the trade-oﬀ for tax policy is a still diﬀerent
one. Reducing the degree of tax discrimination in favor of mobile capital reduces the eﬀective tax rate
on both mobile and immobile capital, but at the same time it also reduces the incentives for ﬁrms to
invest in a tax-favored multinational structure. The welfare eﬀects of a coordinated reduction in tax
preferences then depend on the elasticity with which ﬁrms can change their organizational form.
17at the symmetric equilibrium (si = sj = 0.5), as characterized in Section 4. It is shown
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β
< 0 for 1 + n + 2nε − ε > 0, (23)
where |J| > 0 is given in eq. (A.18) in the appendix.
Equation (22) shows that the smaller country imposes a lower statutory tax rate and
thus also has a lower eﬀective tax rate on domestic ﬁrms than the larger country. The
eﬀect of country size on (the diﬀerence in) thin capitalization rules depends on the sign
of 1 + n + 2nε − ε and is thus not unambiguous when ε can become arbitrarily large.
However, a suﬃcient conditions for this term to be positive is that the extra value of
one unit of corporate tax revenue is less than 100 percent.16 Our further analysis is
based on this case where ε is not too high. A fall in si will then lead to a more lenient
TCR in the smaller country (a higher level of λi), in comparison to the policy of the
larger neighbor j. With a lower statutory tax rate and a lower tax base in the smaller
country, we also get the unambiguous result that the smaller country levies the lower
eﬀective tax rate on mobile ﬁrms. These results are summarized in:
Proposition 4 Starting from a symmetric tax competition equilibrium, suppose that
the population size of one country is increased while the size of the other country is
reduced by the same amount. In the asymmetric Nash equilibrium, the smaller country
then levies the lower statutory tax rate. If ε is not too large (ε < 1), then the smaller
country also chooses the more lenient thin capitalization rule.
The ﬁrst part of this proposition is in accordance with the results of the asymmetric
tax competition models in Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1991). They show that,
with equal per capita endowments, the smaller country faces a higher elasticity of the
mobile capital tax base with respect to its own tax rate and hence ﬁnds it optimal
to choose the lower (eﬀective) tax rate. The additional result in Proposition 4 is that
the smaller country will also oﬀer mobile ﬁrms the larger reduction in their tax base
and thus discriminates more in favor of MNEs. This is again a result of targeting. In
comparison to its larger neighbor, the small country faces the higher tax base elasticity
only for mobile, but not for immobile ﬁrms. Hence, oﬀering a more generous TCR
16An alternative suﬃcient condition is n ≥ 0.5.
18Table 1: Simulation results for tax competition with asymmetric country size
parameters endogenous variables





(1) 0.5 0.3 0.5 2.0 0.151 0.151 0.433 0.433 0.231 0.231 0.296 0.296
(2) 0.4 0.3 0.5 2.0 0.186 0.092 0.434 0.439 0.216 0.258 0.296 0.299
(3) 0.4 0.4 0.5 2.0 0.129 0.038 0.532 0.539 0.268 0.319 0.337 0.340
(4) 0.4 0.3 0.4 2.0 0.266 0.184 0.396 0.401 0.173 0.207 0.278 0.280
(5) 0.4 0.3 0.5 3.0 0.325 0.252 0.552 0.559 0.216 0.258 0.395 0.399
Note: Parameter values that are held constant in all simulations: n = 0.5, ¯ α = 0.1, a = 3.
in comparison to its neighbor allows the small country to compete aggressively for
internationally mobile capital, while at the same time limiting the tax revenue loss
from a reduced taxation of its immobile tax base.
To illustrate the workings of our model with diﬀerences in country size, and to test
whether the analytical ﬁndings continue to hold for large asymmetries, we carry out a
set of simulation analyses. The results are shown in Table 1. Row (1) in the table gives
the results for the symmetric benchmark case. In row (2) an asymmetry is introduced
by reducing the relative size of country A to sA = 0.4 (and hence sB = 0.6). The
simulations show that the small country reduces its statutory tax rate only slightly
below that of its larger neighbor, but chooses a much more generous thin capitalization
rule. This result conﬁrms our earlier argument that the competition for mobile capital
occurs mainly through thin capitalization rules in the present model. In row (3) the
extra value of corporate tax revenue (ε) is raised in both countries. This leads to tighter
thin capitalization rules (reduced levels of λi) and higher statutory tax rates in both
countries, as compared to the results in row (2). In line (4) a higher elasticity of the
mobile tax base and more aggressive tax competition is analyzed through a reduction
in the curvature parameter b of both countries’ production functions. This relaxes
thin capitalization rules and reduces statutory tax rates in both countries. In row (5),
an increase in the agency costs of internal debt (a rise in β) causes an increase in the
statutory tax rate that is fully compensated for mobile ﬁrms by a simultaneous increase
in λ. Hence the result that τm
i is independent of β [see eq. (15)] holds also in the case
of asymmetric countries. Finally, in all asymmetric equilibria the smaller country levies
the lower statutory tax rate and oﬀers the more generous thin capitalization allowance,
as stated in our analytical result in Proposition 4.
19We now turn to diﬀerences in the per capita endowments of immobile capital ni while
assuming countries of equal population size (sA = sB = 0.5). Hence we consider tax
competition between capital-rich versus capital-poor countries. Again, we start from
an initially symmetric equilibrium and analyze the eﬀects of a marginal increase in
ni on the diﬀerence in the non-cooperatively chosen tax policies. In this analysis we
focus on the eﬀective tax rates as summary measures of the tax burden on mobile and












Proposition 5 In an asymmetric tax competition equilibrium with small diﬀerences
in the per capita endowments with immobile capital, the capital-rich country levies a
higher eﬀective tax rate on immobile capital, but a lower eﬀective tax rate on mobile
capital, relative to its capital-poor neighbor.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 5 is immediately intuitive. An increase in, say, nA raises
the immobile tax base in country A and this makes it attractive for this country’s
government to raise the statutory capital tax rate, and hence also the eﬀective tax
rate on national ﬁrms. The second part of Proposition 5 is more surprising, however.
Even though country A has the higher statutory tax rate, its eﬀective tax rate on
mobile capital falls below that of country B. To understand this result, note that the
marginal productivity of capital falls in country A when this country has the larger
domestic capital stock. This places country A at a disadvantage vis-` a-vis country B
in the competition for mobile ﬁrms. To partly compensate for the lower gross return,
country A thus oﬀers a lower eﬀective tax rate to mobile ﬁrms. Since the statutory tax
rate is simultaneously increased, this can only be brought about by a strong relaxation
of the TCR, which more than compensates mobile ﬁrms for the increase in the statutory
tax rate. Hence the country with the larger per-capita stock of (immobile) capital
unambiguously discriminates more in favor of MNEs than its capital-poorer neighbor.
7 Conclusions
This paper has introduced a model where countries compete for internationally mo-
bile ﬁrms through both statutory tax rates and thin capitalization rules that limit the
20tax-deductibility of internal debt ﬂows within multinational enterprises. Starting from
a tax competition equilibrium with ineﬃciently low tax rates and ineﬃciently lax thin
capitalization rules, we have shown that a coordinated policy of tightening thin cap-
italization rules will beneﬁt both countries, even though it induces them to compete
more aggressively via statutory tax rates. The reason is that tax competition occurs
primarily through thin capitalization rules in the present model, whereas statutory tax
rates balance the (domestic and international) excess burden of taxation with the extra
value of collecting corporate tax revenue. Therefore, even an isolated coordination of
thin capitalization rules is an eﬀective way to reduce the overall intensity of corporate
tax competition.
These results of our model correspond to some recent developments and empirical ﬁnd-
ings in the literature. Altshuler and Grubert (2006) provide data for the United States
showing that the introduction of “hybrid entities” in 1997, which made it easier for
U.S. multinationals to avoid taxes on intercompany payments like interest and royal-
ties, induced a large growth in such payments and substantially increased the disparity
in the reported proﬁtability of subsidiaries in high-tax and low-tax jurisdictions. At the
same time the authors ﬁnd that the link between international tax rate diﬀerentials
and foreign direct investment was signiﬁcantly weakened by this change in tax rules.
This is consistent with the implication of our model that tax competition for multi-
national ﬁrms occurs mostly through tax rules that are explicitly targeted at mobile
capital, whereas statutory corporate tax rates may be of secondary importance in this
process. The adverse eﬀects of tight thin capitalization restrictions on inward foreign
direct investment are conﬁrmed in the recent empirical study by Buettner et al. (2008).
In a tax competition environment we can thus expect that countries indeed set their
thin capitalization rules less strictly than they otherwise would, for fear of losing for-
eign direct investment to other regions. At a general level, the results of our model
thus support a coordinated tightening of thin capitalization rules, as is envisaged in
the recent proposals for corporate tax reform in the European Union.
A well-known problem in international tax coordination is, however, that countries
with diﬀerent characteristics have diverging national interests and individual countries
may veto coordination measures, even if the latter are potentially Pareto improving.
Our analysis has therefore incorporated asymmetries between countries with respect
to population size and per capita endowments with capital. In particular, we have
shown that small countries will not only choose lower corporate tax rates, but they
21will also opt for more lenient thin capitalization rules than their larger neighbors. A
ﬁrst look at the thin capitalization regulations in diﬀerent OECD countries seems to be
roughly consistent with this prediction. Moreover, we have shown that countries with
larger endowments of (internationally immobile) capital will oﬀer more favorable tax
conditions for mobile ﬁrms than their capital-poorer neighbors.
Our analysis can be extended in several ways. First, we have assumed that intra-ﬁrm
ﬁnancial transactions are exclusively driven by tax considerations while ignoring any
non-tax reasons for such ﬂows. Empirical research shows, however, that U.S. multina-
tionals use internal capital markets to overcome market imperfections in the external
credit markets of their host countries (see Desai at al., 2004; Buettner et al., 2006).
Incorporating such productive purposes of intra-ﬁrm ﬁnancial transactions may have
interesting repercussions on the optimal setting of thin capitalization rules. Second,
thin capitalization rules may also be driven by ‘fairness’ considerations, in the sense
that (some) governments may perceive an extra beneﬁt of taxing national and multi-
national ﬁrms at similar eﬀective rates. Developing the implications of tax competition
between fair-minded governments, or between one government that is fair-minded and
one that is not, is a further possible issue for future research.
22Appendix
A.1. Pareto eﬃcient tax policy
Symmetry (sA = sB = 0.5, nA = nB = n) implies tA = tB = t and λA = λB = λ.
Equation (8) then yields kA = kB = 1+n. Using (3), (4), (5) and (6) in (11), we obtain
uA + uB = 2(1 + n)
￿
a − b(1 + n) − t
￿





+ 2t(1 + ε)(1 + n)
￿





The derivative of (A.1) with respect to λ reads
∂(uA + uB)
∂λ
= −2εt < 0.
Hence, we obtain the corner solution λPO = 0 as stated in (12). Inserting λPO = 0 into
(A.1) and diﬀerentiating with respect to t gives
∂(uA + uB)
∂t















Solving this condition with respect to t gives the eﬃcient tax rate tPO in (12).
A.2. Symmetric tax competition
Diﬀerentiating (11) and taking into account (3) – (8) and si + sj = 1 yields
∂ui
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with i ∈ {A,B} and































Analogously diﬀerentiating (11) with respect to λi yields
∂ui
∂λi





with i ∈ {A,B}. Symmetry yields the second equilibrium condition








− ε = 0. (A.6)
Equations (A.4) and (A.6) constitute a system of two equations in the two unknowns
t∗ and λ∗. Solving this equation system yields (13) and (14) in the main text.
23A.3. Partial tax coordination
We totally diﬀerentiate (A.2) and use dki = 0, since dλi = dλj = dλ from the coor-
dinated change in the thin capitalization rules and dti = dtj follows from symmetry.








(1 + 2ε)(1 + n)
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where µ∗ = 1 − λ∗ − ¯ α − t∗/β. Substituting the values for t∗ and λ∗ in the intial
equilibrium [eqs. (13) and (14)] yields eqs. (19) and (20) in the main text.
A.4. Asymmetric tax competition
Totally diﬀerentiating (8), (A.2) and (A.5) and evaluating the resulting expressions at
the symmetric equilibrium yields
γ1dti + γ2dλi + γ3dki + γ4dni + γ5dsi = 0, (A.8)




+ γ10(dtj − dti) + γ11(dλj − dλi), (A.10)
with i,j ∈ {A,B}, i  = j and
γ1 = −
βn2(1 + ε)(1 − ¯ α)2(1 + n + 2εn) + 2b(1 + n + ε + 2εn)2
β2n2(1 + ε)(1 − ¯ α)2 , γ2 = ε, (A.11)
γ3 =
b(1 + n + ε + 2εn)2(1 + 2ε) − βεn2(1 + ε)2(1 − ¯ α)2
βn(1 + ε)(1 − ¯ α)(1 + n + ε + 2εn)
, (A.12)
γ4 = −
b(1 + n + ε + 2εn)2(1 + 2ε) − βεn(1 + n)(1 + ε)2(1 − ¯ α)2
βn(1 + ε)(1 − ¯ α)(1 + n + ε + 2εn)
, (A.13)
γ5 =
4bε(1 + n + ε + 2εn)
βn(1 + ε)(1 − ¯ α)
, γ6 =
2b(1 + n + ε + 2εn)2 − βεn2(1 + ε)(1 − ¯ α)2
2bβn(1 − ¯ α)(1 + n + ε + 2εn)
, (A.14)
γ7 = −
βεn(1 + ε)(1 − ¯ α)




, γ9 = −2ε, γ10 =
1 + n + ε + 2εn
βn(1 + ε)(1 − ¯ α)
, (A.15)
γ11 = −
βεn(1 − ¯ α)
2b(1 + n + ε + 2εn)
. (A.16)
In computing (A.11) – (A.16) we used the equilibrium values (13) and (14). Next we
derive (A.8) for country j, subtract the resulting expression from (A.8) and use (A.10)
24to replace dki and dkj. Proceeding in the same way with (A.9) yields
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After some tedious computations, the determinant of the matrix J can be written as
|J| =
εn(1 − ¯ α)[b(2 + 3ε)(1 + n + ε + 2εn)3 − βε2n2(1 + ε)2(1 − ¯ α)2]
2b2(1 + n + ε + 2εn)3 . (A.18)
Stability of the Nash equilibrium implies |J| > 0.17
To derive (22) and (23) in the text, we set dsi = −dsj in (A.17). Applying Cramer’s rule
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(1 + n + ε + 2εn)2[2ε(2 + 3ε) + n(1 + ε)(1 + 4ε) + (n + 2εn)2]
2βn(1 + n + ε + 2εn)2|J|
−
ε2n(1 + n)(1 + ε)2(1 − ¯ α)2
2b(1 + n + ε + 2εn)2|J|
.
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b(1 + 2ε)[βε2n(1 + ε)(1 − ¯ α)2 + b(1 + n + ε + 2εn)3])
b(2 + 3ε)(1 + n + ε + 2εn)3 − βε2n2(1 + ε)2(1 − ¯ α)2 < 0, (A.20)
where the signs of (A.19) and (A.20) follow from the stability condition |J| > 0. This
proves (24) in the text.
17Stability requires that the Jacobian determinant of the system of equations consisting of (A.2)
and (A.5) for i ∈ {A,B}, evaluated at the symmetric Nash equilibrium, has to be negative semideﬁnite.
It can be shown that this stability condition implies |J| > 0. Details can be obtained upon request.
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